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SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR RODES'
DRAFT CONVENTION
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
Professor Rodes has prepared a Draft Convention on Clandestine
Warfare that would have no chance of adoption at any intergovernmen-
tal conference on humanitarian law. Some would question the usefulness
of such an exercise. Those pragmatic doubters, I think, would be'missing
the point. It is very useful indeed to see whether, and how, humanitarian
rights and duties could be formulated for an increasingly common type
of armed conflict, if we could be free from the political constraints imposed
by governments that do not wish to impart legitimacy to insurrections
and revolutions within their own territories.' Only if someone like Pro-
fessor Rodes is willing to try to formulate these rights and duties in such
an "unrealistic" way can we judge whether the attempts governments
are actually willing to make -such as the attempts embodied in the two
1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 2-are themselves
realistic or useful.
Professor Rodes asks the reader to consider the methods of clandes-
tine warfare from the standpoint of a person who believes in the cause,
while the countermeasures should be considered from the standpoint of
a person who believes that the clandestine force should be rigorously
suppressed.3 It would have been better simply to ask the reader to ac-
cept two propositions: (a) clandestine warfare is not simply a matter for
municipal law even though the clandestine forces may not satisfy the
conditions of Protocol I, article 1(4) or of Protocol II, article 1(1);1 and (b)
* Professor of Law and Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and
Lee University School of Law.
I One aspect of Professor Rodes' Draft Convention on Clandestine Warfare (Draft
Convention) (reprinted at 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 358 (1982)) does seem excessively unreal-
istic. In article 1(4) he seems to say that the Convention would bind nonparties. See Rodes,
On Clandestine Warfare, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 333, 358-59 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Rodes]. Moreover, it apparently would bind them even if no party to the conflict is a party
to the Convention, so long as the warfare is in or merely "affects" the territory of a party to
the Convention. See Draft Convention, art. 1(1). The international political-legal order simp-
ly has not reached the stage at which one may talk seriously about such legislative decision-
making for nonconsenting political entities.
2 Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, signed
June 10, 1977, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 and 1442 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol
I and Protocol II].
3 Rodes, supra note 1, at 334-35.
Protocol I, art. 1(4), supra note 2, relates to armed conflicts of self-determination.
Protocol II, art. 1(1), supra note 2, relates to internal armed conflicts when dissident
forces are under responsible command and exercise a significant degree of territorial con-
trol.
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humanitarian rules that do not effectively recognize clandestine forces'
need to be clandestine, and central goverments' need to find and engage
their enemies, will not be obeyed. Acceptance of these propositions
would be sufficient for Professor Rodes' purposes, and would avoid the
necessity of asking whether a true believer would accept each provision
that limits the freedom of one side or the other.
Any attempt to evaluate or to reformulate the humanitarian law of
clandestine or conventional war must focus clearly on the purposes of
humanitarian law. Professor Rodes has accurately identified two central
purposes: to sustain some sort of relation between two "litigants," each
of whom struggles to obtain a favorable judgment; and to give some
degree of precision to moral principles about how fighting should be con-
ducted if there must be fighting at all.' The former purpose looks toward
the conclusion of the struggle, when the judgment has been rendered.
Its underlying premise is that if the parties have been given some stan-
dards of permissible conduct to obey during the struggle, and if they
have actually observed them, there is a better chance for reconcilia-
tion- or at least for peaceful coexistence-among former enemies after
the war than if they had been free to act as they pleased toward their op-
ponents or toward civilians during the struggle. The latter purpose
simply recognizes that conflict, no matter how bitter, cannot justify the
suspension of certain moral principles if humankind is to avoid a descent
into savagery, and tries to supply reasonably clear guidance for the at-
tainment of those principles.
Both of these purposes are served by protecting noncombatants
from the terrors of war, insofar as it is feasible to do so. International
law always has recognized that noncombatants' interests will not be
honored in practice when they stand in the way of combatants' attain-
ment of military objectives, at least if those objectives are "legitimate."
Consequently, it would be futile for the law to try to place noncom-
batants' interests ahead of combatants' interests in such cases. Thus the
humanitarian law of war has tried to strike a delicate balance, protecting
civilians whenever possible, but recognizing overriding military neces-
sity.
My primary criticism of Professor Rodes' Draft Convention is that it
fails adequately to weigh the noncombatants' interests in that balance.
He does acknowledge their interests,' and he "tries to limit the categories
of persons subject to attack.' In his concern for giving clandestine forces
the authority to ply their trade, however, he makes their failure to
distinguish themselves from noncombatants neither a war crime nor a
cause for forfeiture of prisoner-of-war status. This permissiveness is a
radical departure from the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which con-
Rodes, supra note 1, at 353.
Id. at 355, 356.
Id. at 356-57; Draft Convention, arts. 3, 6.
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ditions prisoner-of-war status on, inter alia, the wearing of a distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance and the carrying of arms openly.' It is a
less radical, but significant, departure from Protocol I. That Protocol
drops the distinctive sign requirement, but requires combatants to
distinguish themselves from civilians while engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack. It denies prisoner-of-war
status to clandestine forces who are captured while failing to carry arms
openly during a military engagement or while visible to the adversary
during a military deployment preceding an attack.10 Concerned persons
have long recognized that civilians are exposed to grave personal risks if
forces vulnerable to attack from irregulars cannot, in moments of
danger, distinguish their actual or potential adversaries from the rest of
the populace." Proscriptions against indiscriminate bombing or free fire
zones1 2 will not protect civilians in such cases.
Probably the Protocol I solution is the best balance currently at-
tainable between recognition of clandestine forces' need to be clandes-
tine, on the one hand, and the need to protect noncombatants, on the
other.'3 That solution, however, should be extended beyond Protocol I
conflicts (i.e., international conflicts, including "wars of self-
determination") to include any clandestine warfare situation that meets
the conditions of Professor Rodes' Draft Convention articles 1(1) and 2(1).
This extension would provide clandestine forces in "noninternational"
conflicts with some incentive to distinguish themselves from civialians
at crucial times, and thus would offer civilians in such conflicts a degree
of protection not currently available to them.
Professor Rodes' restrictions on the conduct of hostilities would
establish one new set of rules for clandestine forces and another set for
their opponents.'4 The new rules for clandestine forces are tailored to
tactics heretofore used by such forces, and the rules for government
forces are similarly tailored to their usual tactics. In practice, however,
most of the restrictions could profitably be applied to the forces on
either side. Professor Rodes probably has indirectly imposed his rules
for clandestine forces on both sides, by saying that government forces
remain subject to the obligations they would have in wars against con-
' Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4(2), 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
W Protocol I, art. 44(3) and (4), supra note 2.
" See, e.g., H. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 46-47
(Naval War College International Law Studies, vol. 59, 1978).
" Draft Convention, art. 6(1(g and (h).
" Cf. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 773-74 (1981). 1 am
not maintaining that the Protocol I solution is free from ambiguity or would be ideal if the
ambiguities could be resolved. For some of the conflicting interpretations of its key provi-
sions, see Herczegh, The Extension of the Notion of Combatant in the Light of the Geneva
Protocols of 1977, reprinted in EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON HUMANITARIAN LAW 47, 53-54 (1979).
" Draft Convention, arts. 3, 6.
, Draft Convention, art. 6.
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ventional forces."5 The usual rules against such things as perfidy and the
intentional terrorizing of civilians'" incorporate Professor Rodes' restric-
tions on clandestine forces. On the other hand, he has not effectively
taken the pertinent rules intended for government forces and imposed
them upon clandestine forces. For example, government forces have
been known to expose innocent persons to danger in order to discourage
attacks, a tactic proscribed by Professor Rodes for those forces;" but
clandestine forces have been known to adopt the same tactic, and they
should similarly be prohibited from doing so.
My final point concerns Professor Rodes' provisions on the adminis-
tration of justice by clandestine forces. He would permit them to ad-
minister criminal justice over conduct in territory not under their con-
trol or over persons not within their custody, in certain circumstances. 8
After a trial in absentia, the convicted person could be attacked for the
purpose of carrying out the sentence. 9 This result would be vigilante
justice at its worst. It is not necessary to permit such proceedings in
order to place clandestine forces on an equal footing with conventional
forces. If there is no genuine necessity for potentially lethal proceedings
so bereft of normal jurisdictional bases and of fundamental procedural
safeguards, they certainly should not be condoned. A fortiori, they
should not specifically be authorized.
1" See Protocol I, arts. 37 and 51(2), supra note 2. Professor Rodes' Draft Convention
would make provisions such as those prohibiting perfidy and frightening of citizens ap-
plicable even to armed conflicts that are outside the express coverage of Protocol I. See
Draft Convention, art. 1(2).
" Draft Convention, art. 6(11(c).
" Draft Convention, art. 5.
" See Draft Convention, art. 3(11(e).
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